

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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FOI/PA# 1350695-0

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Memorandum

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Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. Bayse *WMB/20*

Date 3/23/87

From

Special Committee ON

b6
b7C

Subject : TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM) /
JOHN E. OTTO
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR (EAD)

This memorandum is classified "~~CONFIDENTIAL~~" in its entirety, unless otherwise noted. (U)

PURPOSE: To report the results of a TSCM inspection conducted of EAD OTTO'S office.

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only. (U)

APPROVED:

Director _____

Exec. AD-Adm. _____

Exec. AD-Inv. _____

Exec. AD-LES _____

Adm. Servs. _____

Crim. Inv. _____

Ident. _____

Inspection _____

Intell. _____

Laboratory _____

Legal Coun. _____

Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____

Rec. Mgnt. _____

Tech. Servs. *WMB/20*

Training _____

DETAILS: On 3/10/87, Electronics Technician [redacted] conducted a TSCM inspection of EAD OTTO'S office. The TSCM inspection consisted of a radio frequency check, a physical and electronic search, and of a check of telephones and telephone lines. *dlw*

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No evidence of any eavesdropping or tampering with the telephones and telephone lines was noted. (U)

105-19581-1253

APR 29 1987

- 1 - Mr. Otto
- 1 - Mr. Bayse

- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]

(TSCM inspections) *wef*

b6
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Classified by: 9175
Declassify on: OADR

MAE:ET (6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

48 AUG 25 1987

Memorandum

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1253



Exec AD Adm. _____
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Adm. Servs. _____
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Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : [redacted] b6 per FBI
b7C

Date 3/13/87

From : W. A. Bayse *was/10*

Committee

Subject : TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM) MATTERS/
LEGAL ATTACHE (LEGAT) OFFICES BONN, ROME

This memorandum is classified "~~CONFIDENTIAL~~" in its entirety when "~~SECRET~~" material is detached or unless otherwise noted. (U)

REFERENCE: Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. BAYSE dated 5/8/86. (Copy attached to original for quick reference) b6 per FBI
b7C

PURPOSE: To request authorization for Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [redacted] to travel to Bonn, Germany, and to Rome, Italy, to install the new telephone system recommended in referenced communication and to conduct a TSCM inspection of the Legal Attache Offices. b6 per FBI
b7C

RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. That SSA [redacted] be authorized to travel to Bonn, Germany, and Rome, Italy, to install a new telephone key system and to conduct a TSCM inspection of the Legal Attache Offices. If approved, please forward travel form to Mr. OTTO so he may forward it to DOJ for approval. b6 per FBI
b7C

EWB

APPROVED:

Director _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____

Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____

Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____

OLTA

- Enclosures (3) *teletype sent 3/23*
- 1 - [redacted] (Enclosures 2)
 - 1 - Mr. Otto (Enclosures 3)
 - 1 - [redacted] (Enclosures 2)
Attn: [redacted]
 - 1 - [redacted] (Enclosures 2)
Attn: Mr. Stoops
 - 1 - Mr. Bayse (Enclosures 2)
 - 1 - Mr. Evans (Enclosures 2)
Attn: Mr. Wade
 - 1 - [redacted] (Enclosures 2)

- travel form sent*
105-19581-1254
- 1 - [redacted] (Enclosures 2)
 - 1 - Mr. Johnson (Enclosures 2)
 - 1 - [redacted] (Enclosures 2)

Classified by: 9175
Declassify on: OADR

(Continued-over)

7 AUG 17 1987

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Memorandum from W. A. Bayse to [redacted] b6 per FBI
Re: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM) MATTERS/
LEGAL ATTACHE (LEGAT) OFFICES BONN, ROME b7C

2. That if recommendation number 1 is approved, that technical assistance be requested from the Chicago Division and enclosed teletype be sent.

OLTA [signature] *EWL [signature]* *day*

APPROVED:	Adm. Servs. _____	Laboratory _____
	Crim. Inv. _____	Legal Coun. _____
Director _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____	
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Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Inspection _____	Tech. Servs. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Intell. _____	Training _____

DETAILS: As a result of TSCM inspections of the Bonn and Rome Legal Attache Offices, recommendations were made to have the current telephone systems in these Legat Offices replaced with Merlin Model 820 sets for efficiency, operational and security reasons. The Operations Management Section, Telecommunications Unit, has procured the recommended telephone sets which are being tested by Engineering Section personnel. Merlin telephone systems have been approved by the Telephone Security Group (TSG) of the Intelligence Community for installation in sensitive areas and [redacted]

Referral/Direct

Referral/Direct

b6 per FBI
b7C

In view of the above, it is being recommended that SSA [redacted] travel to Bonn, Germany, and Rome, Italy, to install the new Merlin telephone systems and to conduct TSCM inspections of both Legat Offices. It is also being recommended that technical assistance be requested from the Chicago Division to assist SSA [redacted] in the installation of the telephones and to conduct TSCM inspections.

b6 per FBI
b7C

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b6 per FBI
b7C

Memorandum from W. A. Bayse to [redacted]
Re: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM) MATTERS/
LEGAL ATTACHE (LEGAT) OFFICES BONN, ROME

On 2/6/87, SSA [redacted] contacted Chicago ASAC [redacted] and advised him that FBIHQ, Technical Services Division (TSD), would request technical assistance from his division to conduct TSCM inspections and to install new telephone systems at Legat Offices Bonn and Rome. ASAC [redacted] stated that SSA [redacted] would be available to assist if FBIHQ requested assistance. SSA [redacted] has received TSCM Phase I and II training and has attended TSCM up-dates.

b6 per FBI
b7C

Date of travel is tentatively scheduled for 5/7/87 and will take approximately two weeks.

This travel has been coordinated with Unit Chief [redacted] Telecommunications Unit, Operations Management Section, TSD and with [redacted]

b6 per FBI
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Referral/Direct

Communications to Legats Bonn and Rome concerning this trip are pending concurrence from DOS.

The estimated cost of this trip for SSA [redacted] is

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~~SECRET~~

Mr. Bayse

5/8/86

[REDACTED]

b6 per FBI
b7C

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM) MATTERS/
LEGAL ATTACHE (LEGATS) OFFICES BERN, BONN, LONDON,
PARIS AND ROME/TRIP REPORT ~~(C)~~ (U)

PURPOSE: To report on the TSCM inspections of Legal Attache
Offices Bern, Bonn, London, Paris and Rome. ~~(C)~~ (U)

SYNOPSIS: TSCM inspections were conducted of Legal Attache
Offices Bern, Switzerland; Bonn, Germany; London,
England; Paris, France and Rome, Italy. All TSCM inspections
consisted of physical and electronic searches, radio frequency
checks and physical and technical examinations of all telephones
and telephone lines. No evidence of any eavesdropping was noted
during these inspections, however, several discrepancies were
noted in Legat offices Paris and Rome. [REDACTED] the Paris
Legat Office has a common wall with the adjoining building which
is not under U. S. control, cleaning personnel are unescorted in
the Legat Office space, and the office needs venetian blinds
and/or draperies. Rome analyst support employee should be
advised that the telephone lines may be monitored by the host
country and that sensitive subjects or personal comments
criticizing local government personnel should be avoided. The
Bonn and Rome Legat Offices should be provided with AT & T Merlin
electronic telephone systems with the Key Service Unit installed
in office space controlled by the respective Legat Office. ~~(C)~~ (U)

b7E per FBI

Enclosures (3)

1 - Mr. Clarke (Information only)
1 - Mr. Geer
Attention: Liaison Unit
1 - [REDACTED]
Attention: Mr. Wells
1 - Mr. Monroe
Attention: Mr. Stoops
1 - Mr. Bayse
1 - Mr. Evans
Attention: Mr. Wade

1 - [REDACTED]
1 - Mr. Johnson
1 - [REDACTED]
① - [REDACTED]

b6 per FBI
b7C

ET/ (12)

Classified by: 8
Declassify : OADR

105-19581-1254

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Memorandum from [] to Mr. Bayse
Re: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE /TRIP REPORT

b6 per FBI
b7c

RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. That Operations Management Section,
Telecommunications Unit, provide an AT & T
Merlin system model 820, with seven PEC 9400 079 telephone
sets and one model Z7305H02B telephone set for each Bonn and
Rome Legat Offices. ~~(S)~~ (U)

2. That a threat assessment, both physical and
technical, be conducted at the Paris and Rome Legat Offices by
expert personnel in both disciplines in order that inadequacies
mentioned be corrected at the earliest time possible. ~~(S)~~ (U)

3. That all cleaning personnel be escorted while in
the Paris Legat Office space. ~~(S)~~ (U)

4. That venetian blinds and/or draperies be installed
in the Paris Legat Office. ~~(S)~~ (U)

5. That a closed circuit television be installed at
the entrance to the Paris Legat Office. ~~(S)~~ (U)

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Memorandum from [] to Mr. Bayse
Re: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE /TRIP REPORT

~~(C)~~ (U)

b6 per FBI
b7C


that have been approved by the Intelligence Community for use in sensitive areas. These telephone units have been given a special designation by AT & T as follows: ~~(C)~~ (U)

1. PEC 9400 - 078 5 button
2. PEC 9400 - 079 10 button
3. PEC 9400 - 080 34 button (Has no lights on the last 20 buttons)

However, it is recommended that one Merlin telephone model Z7305H02B, 34 button unit with lights on all buttons, be modified as the PEC 9400 - 080 and used in order that support personnel can determine when Agent personnel are on one of the telephone extensions or the outside telephone line. This telephone unit would have to be modified by AT & T in order to meet the technical security requirements set by the Intelligence Community. Additional details on this can be obtained from SSA [] ~~(C)~~ (U)

b6 per FBI
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
Referral/Direct



London: No discrepancies or evidence of eavesdropping was noted during the TSCM inspection. ~~(C)~~ (U)

Engineering Section personnel installed an AT & T Merlin 820 telephone system that had been provided by the Telecommunications Unit. This system replaced rotary dialed Western Electric 830 telephones. ~~(C)~~ (U)

Referral/Direct



b6 per FBI
b7C

Paris: During the TSCM inspection at the Paris Legat Office space several discrepancies were noted and they are as follows: ~~(C)~~ (U)

1. The Paris Legat Office is located on []

b7E per FBI

[] The office space has a common wall with the adjoining

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Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. Bayse
Re: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE /TRIP REPORT ~~(C)~~ (U)

b6 per FBI
b7C

building which is not under U. S. control and [redacted] is
located in this area. [redacted]

b7E per FBI

[redacted] The office has an on-line KW7
crypto system with a mechanical model 28 teletype. This teletype
system is so loud when printing that it may be possible to pick
up acoustical sounds from the adjoining building. (Office layout
is enclosed) ~~(S)~~ (U)

2. The cleaning personnel (French nationals) have full
access to all areas of the office space with the exception of the
vault area. They are not escorted by either Legat Office or
U. S. Marine personnel. ~~(C)~~ (U)

3. The office space does not have draperies or
venetian blinds, therefore, most office space is exposed to full
view from adjoining apartments and other offices. Although all
windows have awnings, most of these awnings do not work
properly. ~~(C)~~ (U)

Referral/Direct

~~(U)~~

b6 per FBI
b7C
b7E

~~(U)~~

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Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. Bayse
Re: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE /TRIP REPORT ~~(S)~~ (U)

b6 per FBI
b7C

4. The entrance to the Legat Office is controlled by a switch located on each desk, however, Legat Office personnel do not have means of knowing the identity of any person wanting access to the office space. Although this may be true of most other Legat Offices, the Paris Legat Office is located outside of the U.S. Embassy and it should have a closed circuit television so that office personnel can observe people wanting access to the Legat Office. ~~(S)~~ (U)

Rome: During the TSCM inspection of the Rome Legat Office space, the following discrepancies were noted: ~~(S)~~ (U)

1. The Key Service Unit for the multi-line telephones used in the Legat Office was located outside of the office. It was located [redacted]

b7E per FBI

(Office layout enclosed) ~~(S)~~ (U)

2. [redacted]

b7E per FBI

3. While conducting the TSCM inspection, SSA [redacted] overheard the Legat Office support analyst employee in telephonic conversation with Quantico personnel discussing a case which was investigated by [redacted]. During the conversation, the support employee made negative remarks about the way the investigation was conducted by the [redacted] SSA [redacted]. [redacted] advised the support employee that such remarks should not be made of host country personnel as the telephone calls may be monitored. His response was very negative and stated that they [redacted] [redacted] had to be put in their place for their ineptness. ~~(S)~~ (U)

b6 per FBI
b7C

b7D

In addition, the same support employee brought to the Legat Office a set of small Russian wooden dolls that were given to him by a Soviet "friend." These dolls were checked for electronic devices and the check was negative. Since SSA [redacted] does not know the relationship between the support employee and his "Russian friend" from the Russian Embassy or Mission in Rome, the support employee was advised that caution should be taken with gifts from his friend, especially if the gifts are brought to the Legat Office. ~~(S)~~ (U)

b6 per FBI
b7C

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Memorandum from [] to Mr. Bayse b6 per FBI
Re: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE /TRIP REPORT b7C

Above information was brought to the attention of Assistant Legat [] since during this time the Legat Office was under inspection and the Legal Attache was out of town with the Inspector. ~~(C)~~ (U) b6 per FBI b7C

In view of the limited office space in the U. S. Embassy, Rome, and the possibility that attempts are being made to relocate the Legat Office, no recommendations are being made at this time and is being left to the discretion of the Intelligence Division. If Recommendation Number 2 is approved, selected personnel to make the physical and technical threat assessments will make the necessary recommendations.

Referral/Direct

~~(C)~~ (U)

It should be noted that several complaints were voiced by most Legat personnel concerning the teletype systems, lack of any word processing equipment and the lack of secure telephone systems. They were advised to express their concerns to the Technical Services Division, Operations Management Section. ~~(C)~~ (U)

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Memorandum

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Public Affs. _____
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Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. Bayse *wp/c*

Date 3/23/87

From :

[Redacted]

b6 per FBI
b7C

Subject :

[Redacted]

Referral/Direct

PURPOSE:

[Redacted]

RECOMMENDATION: None. For information only. (U)

APPROVED:

Director _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____

Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
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Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
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Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____

DETAILS:

[Redacted]

Referral/Direct

[Redacted]

SSA [Redacted]

Engineering Section, is the FBI

b6 per FBI
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(U) Referral/Direct

DE-176 105-19581-1255

APR 29 1987

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

- 1 - Mr. Geer
- 1 - Mr. Bayse

1 - [Redacted]

- 1 - Mr. Johnson (CMS)
- 1 - [Redacted]

b6 per FBI
b7C

Classified by: 9175
Declassify on: OADR

(SECRET MATERIAL ENCLOSED)

ET/ (7)

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97 SEP 17 1987

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY LIAISON

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

PM
Date: May 5, 1987

To: Mr. D. Jerry Rubino, Director
Security Staff
Justice Management Division

From: William A. Bayse
Assistant Director
Technical Services Division

Subject: TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSCM)
INSPECTION OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE COURT

This document is classified "~~CONFIDENTIAL~~" in its entirety, unless otherwise noted. (U)

Reference is made to your memorandum dated March 16, 1987, requesting a microphone and telephone security survey of the Foreign Intelligence Court.

On April 6, 1987, personnel from the Technical Services Division conducted a TSCM inspection of Room 6725 of the Main Justice Building. The inspection included a radio frequency spectrum check, an examination of all telephones and telephone lines, and a nondestructive physical search. No evidence of clandestine listening devices was found.

[redacted] was verbally advised of the results of the TSCM inspection.

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Classified by 9175
Declassify on OADR

105-19581-1256

1 - Mr. Bayse

1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

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105-19581-1256 (8)

APPROVED:

Adm. Servs. _____ Laboratory _____
Crim. Inv. _____ Legal Coun. _____
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Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____

Director _____
Exec. AD Adm. _____
Exec. AD Inv. _____
Exec. AD LES _____

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Delivered to
DOJ 5-6-87
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Note: The above TSCM check was conducted by Electronics
Technician

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG J48J67T35
ON 08-26-2016

SSP

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~CLASS
SRC'D
SER
RECTo : Assistant Director
Records Management Division

Date 4/10/89

From : W. A. Bayse

Subject : TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES COMMITTEE (105-019581)

PURPOSE: To designate file # 105-019581 or other material identified herein for handling by the SFR as indicated. Execute numbered paragraphs only as they may apply. For new cases, the SFR will insert the file number, but depositors should specify classification desired for file.

1. The attached file/document should receive special restricted processing and access in the SFR for the reasons set forth below (Specify justification):

The referenced file should continue to receive special restricted processing and access. This file is part of an ongoing sensitive and classified FCI program. The nature of the program requires that the file be restricted to the SFR.

2. The Control Officer for file number 105-109581 is designated as the Unit Chief of the Electronic Analysis Unit Unit; Unit cost code 0852, extension number [redacted], room # Newington Alternate Control Officer is the Section Chief of the Engineering Section; extension number [redacted] room # Newington, Division 8

3. The following entities may be granted direct access to this file/document with the understanding that no information contained therein may be used or extracted without the knowledge and concurrence of the depositor. (Check as appropriate or specify additional).

- a. Legal Counsel Division
- b. Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts Section
- c. Classification Appeals and Affidavits Unit

22 MAY 4 1989

~~CLASSIFIED BY 9175~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: QADR~~CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~① - [redacted]
(Attn: SFR)
1 - Mr. Bayse1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]b6
b7Cf mms
SBR/ [signature]

40 MAY 10 1989

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105-19581-1258

[signature]

5/3/89 Am
Insert 2 Under updated
100-2051189
100-66-17404

CLASSIFICATION:

- d. Elsur Index Subunit_____
- e. Security Programs Unit_____
- f. Name Check and Service Unit_____
- g. Industrial Security and
Clearance Invest. Unit_____
- h. Facility Access and Security Unit_____
- i. SA _____

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4. File #_____ should be removed from the
SFR and placed in general filing space. Authorized by
_____(Signature and Title).

5. The code word/name_____ should be
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and identify approving communication. Also, submit search slip
showing General Indices was searched.)

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